The aim of this research is to give a simple framework to evaluate/quantize the transparency of a firm. We assume that the process of the firm value is only observable once in a while but is strongly correlated with the stock price which is observable and tradable. This hybrid type structure make the transparency "observable". The implication of the present study is that the depth of the shock to the market caused by the precise accounting information does reflect the degree of transparency. Furthermore, it can be quantized resorting to the calibration method.
such as Jarrow-Turnbull's [4] and Duffie-Singleton's [2] , the default is an exogenous event, and its probabilistic nature is directly modeled in terms of the default probability or the hazard rate, etc. On the other hand, if the default is endogenous/set to be a consequence of some economic activities, the model is called structural. In most structural models including Merton [8] and Leland-Toft [7] , the default occurs when the firm value process reaches a boundary.
As Jarrow and Protter [3] pointed out, the two approaches can be unified by introducing asymmetry between the the manager's perspective and the market's. The pioneering work in this hybrid approach was done by Duffie and Lando [1] . They assumed a default structure of Leland-Toft type which is not directly observable to the market. This filtering approach of DuffieLand was generalized into the continuous time framework by Kusuoka [6] and Nakagawa [9] .
Hybrid Models and Transparency Risk
It is noteworthy that in the hybrid approach the degree of accounting transparency is modeled implicitly by the difference of the manager's perspective and the market's one. In fact, it is claimed in [1, p.634 l.30-32] that the shape of the term structure of credit spreads may indeed play a useful empirical role in estimating the degree of transparency of a firm, and in [9, p.134 l.13-15] it is pointed out that the credit spread can be explained by the hazard rate plus some fluctuation caused by the difference between the manager's filtration and the market's one. That is to say, we have the following decomposition: credit risk = default risk + transparency risk.
(1.1)
With this view, we can say that in the structural approach only default risk is modeled while in the reduced form approach credit risk is treated without decomposing. The transparency risk is made visible only when one construct a hybrid type model.
Our Motivation/Calibration
The importance of the accounting transparency is now widely recognized among the managers as well as the investors. Of course the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOx) Act of 2002 in U.S.A, followed by J-SOx of September 2007 in Japan, was a cornerstone but they are basically aimed to reduce the transparency risks from the investor's perspective. The decomposition (1.1), however, suggests that the managers can reduce the credit spread by promoting transparency. It says there can be positive incentives for the manager to reduce the transparency risks. This observation is empirically supported by the study of Yu [10] .
The problem is then how we could know the degree of transparency. The formula of Duffie-Lando or the one by Nakagawa is too complicated to calibrate it to the market values. We need simpler formulas but nonetheless it should be based on a hybrid type model.
Structure of Transparency/ Slightly Incomplete Market
Motivated by the above demand, in the present paper we will construct a simple hybrid type model out of the classical Merton's structural model. Structure of transparency is modeled by "ρ-coupling" of Wiener processes. Roughly speaking, the filtration of manager's and market's are generated by two 1-dimensional Wiener processes W and W ′ starting from 0 respectively.
for a constant ρ ∈ (0, 1), which is set the unique parameter describing the transparency. We will work on the continuous time framework but the full accounting information (or the firm value) is supposed to be available at the discrete set of dates t 1 , . . . , t n , . . .. These discrete filtration make the market "slightly incomplete" and thus we need to be careful about the consistency with the no-arbitrage framework.
Main Results
Under the simple hybrid model assumptions described roughly in the above, the present study will show that
• with a proper choice of the state price density, the market value of a firm is obtained by the image of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck semigroup,
• the credit spread formula is explicitly obtained and it doesn't depend explicitly on the transparency parameter at the dates t 1 , . . . , t n , . . .,
• and by this property the parameter can be calibrated to the market value.
Organization of the Rest of the Paper
In section 2.1, we shall give the setting and the market model on which we will be working. The first result on the consistency of our market model is given as Theorem 1. In section 2.2, presented is a result on an economic property of our market model. Under these settings, we will obtain a generic formula (2. 2 The Formulas
The Firm Value and the Market
Let (Ω, F , P) be a probability space on which a one dimensional Wiener process {W t } can be defined, and {F t } be the natural filtration of W . We assume Merton's economy in [8] ; i.e, the firm value is assumed to be
where µ ∈ R and σ ≥ 0. Let T := {t k : k ∈ Z + } ⊂ R + , where t 0 = 0 and t k < t k+1 for each k ∈ Z + , be the dates of the accounting report; namely we suppose that the firm value V is observable only at each t k ∈ T, and during the interval (t k , t k+1 ) the market can only "guess" the firm value. Let
where F ′ t is the natural filtration of W ′ which is introduced in Introduction. Note that the joint law of W and W ′ is completely determined by (1.2).
To be consistent with no-arbitrage framework, we set the state price density of the market by
where r is the constant interest rate and
It should be noted that Z t e rt is a martingale with respect to the filtration {G} and therefore a probability measure Q on {G} is defined by
Our first result is the following.
defines the no-arbitrage price with respect to the state price density Z defined above. Namely, for t k ≤ t < t k+1 , we have
In particular, V ′ t e −rt is a Q-G-martingale.
A proof of Theorem 1 will be given in section 4.1.
Remark 2. The market value of the firm V ′ is explicitly given as
which is the image of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Semigroup T u defined by setting u = log ρ. At the dates t k , the market value of the firm V ′ t k coincides with the firm value V t k . When ρ = 1, the market fully observe the firm value even during the period (t k , t k+1 ).
An Economic Interpretation of the State Price Density Z
Since we set Z to be a state price density,
gives a fair value at time t(< t k ) of the cash flow X at time t k ∈ T. The following proposition could give an economic interpretation of the process C(X).
Proposition 3. The value C(X) is the replication cost (within the market G ) of
which is minimizer of
where
Namely we have, for t < t k
A proof will be given in section 4.2.
The Generic Formulas
In this section we will obtain explicit formulas for C(X) with X = f (V tn ) for a bounded Borel function
Theorem 4.
We have the following explicit formulas for the value C(f (V tn )):
In particular, the expression does not contain ρ at t = t k :
2 dz.
(2.4)
A proof will be given in section 4.3.
Evaluation of Transparency

Default Structure and the Market Value of the Debt
As we have stated in Introduction, for the structure of the default we rely the Merton's classical framework, but actually we need a deeper consideration on the default structure and the firm value. Let {δ t : t ∈ T} be the debt structure of a firm. Here we assume that the maturity of each debt is always in T. We also assume that the default occurs only when and whenever the firm value V t k is less than δ t k . In particular, the default occurs only at the dates of accounting report T. Just like Merton's model, we can set the pay-off of the debt to be min(δ t k , V t k − ), and therefore the market value of the debt is given by
In this debt structure, it may be natural to assume
which is somehow inconsistent with (2.1). To avoid this inconsistency, we only consider the debt with nearest maturity: δ t k > 0 and δ t l = 0 for l < k. under these structural assumptions, we may consider the market value of the firm as the total market value of the issued stock. Furthermore, since default will never occur before the nearest maturity t k , we obtain the following explicit formulas using Theorem 4:
and when t ∈ T in particular,
Discussion for Calibration
Looking at the explicit formulas (3.1) and (3.2), we notice that they depend on the unknown parameters σ and ρ but independent of µ. Furthermore, since the formula (3.2) does not explicitly depend on ρ (of course V ′ does depend on ρ but this does not matter), the parameter σ can be calibrated to the market value D ρ,t k t for t ∈ T. Once we know the parameter σ, the formula (3.1) contains only one unknown parameter ρ. Therefore, it can be calibrated to the market value D ρ,t k t for t ∈ T.
A detailed guidance of the procedure is presented in [5] .
Proofs and Mathematical Results
A Proof of Theorem 1
For t k ≤ t < t k+1
By definition we have
therefore we obtain that
By the exponential martingale property, we obtain that
A Proof of Proposition 3
A Proof of Theorem 4
We calculate C(f (V tn )) t for t k ≤ t < t k+1 ≤ t n ;
where E Q denotes the expectation with respect to equivalent martingale measure Q.
Let us decompose W as
where W ′′ is a one dimensional Wiener process independent of W ′ . Then we have The last identity holds because
is independent of G t and distributed as N(0, (ν σ,ρ (t)) 2 ).
